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Transformations in Statehood, the InvestorState Regime, and the New Constitutionalism
A. CLAIRE CUTLER*
ABSTRACT

This paper examines the changing boundariesof statehood resulting
from transformationsin the nature and operation of public and private
authority over local and global politico-legal orders. Transformations in
the political purposes of states are being driven by powerful elites who
advance a new form of constitutionalgovernance. New constitutionalism,
as evidenced by the investor-state regime, subordinates the interests,
purposes, and rights of national citizens to those of foreign,
transnationalpolitico-legal, and economic elites. This regime is a highly
privatized order that is expanding in influence, both in terms of the
commercial activities under its remit, and in terms of its procedural
operation and its normative influence. The specific focus of this paper is
on the investor-state regime, which is contributing to the expansion of
private power and authority in the settlement of investment disputes.
This regime is effecting two transformations in the scope and nature of
statehood. One transformation involves the imposition of severe limits
upon the legislative and policy autonomy of national governments that
are being developed and enforced by private commercial actors without
public accountability.In agreeing to protect the private property rights of
foreign investors against legislation or public policy that might impair
foreign investment, states are also limited in their abilities to ensure the
protection of the social, economic, or human rights of their peoples.
However, this expansion of private power and authority is generating a
countermovement in the form of resistance to the regime. This resistance
is giving rise to a conflicting transformation in statehood as national
governments seek to regain their policy and legislative autonomy. In
some cases, the impetus comes from local sources, while in others it
emanates from global and internationalhuman rights fora. This paper
* Professor of International Relations and International Law, Department of
Political Science, University of Victoria, Victoria, British Columbia, Canada; MSc (LSE);
PhD (UBC); LLB (McGill).
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begins with an overview of the operational nature of the investor-state
regime and new constitutionalism, revealing how the procedural and
substantive provisions of the regime reach deep inside states to set clear
limits on their legislative and policy autonomy. It then examines a
selection of cases before investor-state tribunals that reveal contestation
and resistance to the regime through the reassertion by state
governments of their sovereignty and through the influence of
international human rights. It concludes with an exploration of the
potential for this regime to advance human rights protections and
suggests a few changes that might enhance the regime's democratic
legitimacy.
INTRODUCTION

As a student of the political foundations of international economic
law, it is easy to be pessimistic about the possibility of humanizing
capital's law-the law facilitating the mobility and expansion of
capitalism.1 Such pessimism is rooted in a deep suspicion of the
distinctions between public and private international law and between
economics and politics that work to depoliticize the entire realm of
international commercial and economic activity and legality and to
immobilize national political authorities. Liberal mythology concerning
the natural, neutral, apolitical, and efficient nature of private
international economic law has been eroding societal and democratic
controls and facilitating the denationalization and delocalization of
capital for some time. These processes of denationalization and
delocalization have in turn transformed statehood by severely
constraining the legislative and policy autonomy of national
governments to pursue public purposes. The potential for international
investment contracts and trade agreements to advance human rights
appears to be small, if not zero. Indeed, the raison d'9tre of these
contracts and agreements is the advancement and protection of the
private property interests of foreign investors. There appears to be very
little room for the advancement or protection of national or local public
interests-such as social, labor, or environmental rights-in contracts
and agreements whose stated purposes are the protection of the private
property interests of foreign investment and trading companies.

1. See A. Claire Cutler, Global Capitalism and Liberal Myths: Dispute Settlement in
PrivateInternational Trade Relations, 24 MILLENNIUM: J. INT'L STUD. 377, 381-87 (1995)
(illustrating how economic and political elites have manipulated the boundary between
private and public international trade law as a means of insulating international
commercial transactions from national and democratic controls).
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However, much has been changing in the governance of the global
political economy and its intersection with local political-legal and social
orders, effecting further transformations in statehood. 2 Many
governments find themselves enmeshed in networks of investment and
trade commitments that severely restrain their abilities to respond to
challenges posed by turbulent world markets, as in the cases of the
Argentine and Greek financial crises. Others, like Canada, find
themselves responsible for the payment of large sums in damages
awards upon arbitral rulings that they breached their investmentprotection commitments to foreign companies. 3 Indeed, the movement to
denationalized and delocalized control over foreign direct investment
has generated a countermovement in the form of resistance to the
regime. In a manner reminiscent of the double movement characterizing
the advent of market civilization theorized by Karl Polanyi, the
investor-state regime is generating contestation. 4 Some states have
severely constrained the ambit of investment protections, like Australia,
while others have gone so far as to exit the global investment regime, as
in the case of many South American states. 5 Criticisms about the closed,
elitist, and nondemocratic nature of dispute settlement under the trade
and investment regimes have been increasingly articulated, and states
such as Canada and the United States are responding by reasserting
their sovereignty in the form of provisions that increase the democratic
legitimacy of these regimes.
At the global level, John Ruggie, as the Special Representative of
the United Nations Secretary General on Business and Human Rights,
initiated a widespread examination of the impact of the foreign
investment regime on human rights. This initiative resulted in the
2. See A. Claire Cutler, Morris Tabaksblat Chair on Private Actors and Globalization,
Hague Inst. for the Internationalisation of Law (HiL), BITs: Turning Shields into
Swords? (April 23, 2012) (Public Lecture delivered at Leiden University and co-sponsored
by HiiL and the Grotius Centre for International Legal Studies for the launch of the
Tabaksblat Chair).
3. See generally AbitibiBowater Inc. v. Government of Canada, Consent Award
(ICSID
Dec.
15,
2010),
http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accordscommerciaux/assets/pdfs/disp-dfffabitibi-03.pdf.
4. See generally KARL POLANYI, THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION: THE POLITICAL AND

ECONOMIC ORIGINS OF OUR TIME (1944) (using Polanyi's concept of "double movement" to
capture how the transformation or movement from a feudal to market economy generated
counter-movements to protect society from the disruptions caused by the operations of
unregulated markets).
5. These criticisms of the investor-state regime are outlined in, U.N. CONFERENCE ON
TRADE AND DEV., WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 2015, at 125, U.N. Sales No. E.15.II.D.5

(2015), available at http://unctad.orgfen/PublicationsLibrary/wir20l5-en.pdf [hereinafter
WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT], and prompted the characterization of the present time as
an "era of re-orientation" to the regime.
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development of United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and
Human Rights (UNGPs) that articulate the social responsibilities of
investing corporations. 6 The UNGPs are now part of a broader
discussion of Principles for Responsible Investment that are being
developed within the United Nations Conference on Trade and
for
Investment
Policy Framework
(UNCTAD)
Development's
Sustainable Development. 7 At UNCTAD's 2014 and 2015 World
Investment Forums, there was significant debate over the nature and
operation of the investor-state regime. States including Brazil, India,
and Indonesia voiced significant criticism of the private arbitration
proceedings that form the core of dispute settlement under the regime.8
Other international organizations, such as the United Nations
Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) and the World
Bank's International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes
(ICSID) are revisiting and revising the rules and procedures governing
investment arbitration to address many of these criticisms. 9
These developments suggest that the terrain of public and private
authority over local and global political economies is shifting as local
and global movements aspire to gain greater control over the activities
of foreign investing corporations and over the actions of their national
governments. This paper tells a story about this shifting terrain of
statehood, situating dispute settlement under the investor-state regime
in the broader context of power and contestation in the governance of
the global political economy. Part I examines the broad contours of the
investor-state regime, illustrating its origins in the protection of private
foreign investment interests and its operation as a form of new

6. The Guiding Principles have been adopted by the United Nations Human Rights
Council and form the basis for a U.N. Working Group on Business and Human Rights. See
generally JOHN GERARD RUGGIE, JUST BUSINESS: MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND

HUMAN RIGHTS (2013) (providing an account of Ruggie's activities as Special
Representative); Larry CatA Backer, Fractured Territories and Abstracted Terrains:
Human Rights Governance Regimes Within and Beyond the State, 23 IND. J. GLOBAL
LEGAL STUD. 61 (2016) (discussing UNGPs); Hans Lindahl, One Pillar:Legal Authority
and a Social License to Operate in a Global Context, 23 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 201
(2016) (same).
7. See Investment Policy Framework for Sustainable Development Introduction:
Introduction,UNCTAD INVESTMENT POLIcY HUB, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.orgl
ipfsd (last visited June 11, 2015) (explaining the guidance for policymakers found in the
2015 Investment Policy Framework for Sustainable Development).
8. See WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT, supra note 5, at 125-132.
9. See generally U.N. Comm'n on Int'l Trade, Rules on Transparency in Investor-State
Arbitration(2014), availableat http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitrationiruleson-transparency/Rules-on-Transparency-E.pdf [hereinafter Rules on Transparency]; see
also Leon E. Trakman, The ICSID Under Siege, 45 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 603 (2012)
(evaluating the criticisms leveled at the ICSID).
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constitutionalism. Part II examines contestation over the regime
principles and decisionmaking procedures and examines a few select
cases that illustrate how appeals to international human rights are
transforming both state authority and the investor-state regime. Part
III assesses the potential for the investor-state regime to address
perceived defects in its operation and its ability to further respond to
human rights challenges in the form of the protection of social, labor,
and environmental rights.
I. THE CONTOURS OF THE INVESTOR-STATE REGIME

The investor-state regime forms a key element in the constitution of
the material and normative foundations of transnational capitalism. It
is also of profound significance to transformations in statehood that are
relocating authority between private and public actors in governance. In
fact, the investor-state regime continues to expand as more states enter
into international investment agreements (HAs) every year. UNCTAD
reports that in 2014 there were twenty-seven new HAs, bringing the
total to 3,268.10 At least forty-five states and four regional associations
are involved in revising their agreements,1 while investors continue to
use investor-state dispute settlement proceedings, with cases initiated
against developed states rising to about 40 percent of the cases. 12 Of 356
concluded cases, 37 percent were decided in favor of the state, while 25
percent in favor of the investor.' 3
The regime is so foundational that it is aptly described as a form of
"new constitutionalism." New constitutionalism is a political project
aimed at the continuous expansion of capitalism through the
entrenchment into national and international legal frameworks of
neoliberal, market-oriented laws and policies that favor privatization,
liberalization, and deregulation of trade, investment, and financial
services, and a host of economic, social, and cultural activities.' 4 New
constitutional disciplines of trade and investment activities are evident
10. IIA TEAM, U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE & DEV., IIA Issues Note, No. 1: Recent
Trends in IAS and ISDS 2 (Feb. 2015), available at http://unctad.org/en/
PublicationsLibrary/webdiaepcb20l5dlen.pdf. Note that these figures do not reflect cases
that were withdrawn, settled or conducted in secrecy.
11. Id. at 2.
12. Id. at 5.
13. Id. at 8.
14. See generally NEW CONSTITUTIONALISM AND WORLD ORDER (Stephen Gill & A.
Claire Cutler eds., 2014); A. Claire Cutler, International Commercial Arbitration,
Transnational Governance, and the New Constitutionalism, in INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE: CONTENDING THEORIES AND
EVIDENCE 140 (Walter Mattli & Thomas Dietz eds., 2014).
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in three characteristics of these legal regimes: the significant insulation
of foreign investment and trade relations from interference by states;
the agreement to standards of behavior that limit the policy and
legislative autonomy of states; and the commitment to dispute
settlement in private arbitral proceedings subject to no or minimal legal
review by national governments and courts.
While the investor-state regime forms part of the larger
international investment regime, it concerns investment arrangements
between states. Unlike other international commercial investment
arrangements involving private, commercial, and corporate actors, the
investor-state regime binds the activities of states. It is thus rooted in
public international law. This is an important consideration that should
become clear as the origins of the investor-state regime are addressed.
The investor-state regime basically provides for investment security by
protecting foreign investors from the expropriation of their assets
without due compensation and from other measures that might impair
their investment. The regime also provides for dispute resolution in
delocalized settings to avoid potential interference from national
policymakers and courts of law. The regime thus removes significant
dimensions of the foreign investment relationship from local or national
contestation, control, and review. This
political and legal
"denationalizing" and "delocalizing" of the investment relationship is
precisely what the regime is designed to do. Indeed, these purposes
originate in the colorful history of the regime and form the basis for its
contemporary contestation.
A. HistoricalOrigins of Denationalized/DelocalizedControl:
TransformationI
Historically, foreign-owned property was governed by reciprocal
agreements amongst European trading states of roughly equal
bargaining power. Over time, however, these reciprocal relationships
gave way to relations of imposition as the rules were applied through
colonial and imperial expansion to non-European states. 15 Putatively
"reciprocal" arrangements were replaced increasingly with one-way
bargains as powerful capital-exporting states were able to dictate the
terms governing the investments of their nationals to less powerful

15. See KATE MILES, THE ORIGINS OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW: EMPIRE,
ENVIRONMENT AND THE SAFEGUARDING OF CAPITAL (2013) (providing a fascinating account
of the investment regime); ANTONY ANGHIE, IMPERIALISM, SOVEREIGNTY AND THE MAKING
OF INTERNATIONAL LAw (2004) (explaining the colonial foundations of international law).
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states who were hosting the investment. 16 More often than not, disputes
over foreign investment were settled by force and "gunboat
diplomacy."' 7 By the nineteenth century, colonial powers entered into
treaties of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation (FCN treaties). While
FCN treaties were not directed specifically at foreign investment, but
were rather drafted to encourage international trade, they did offer
some protection for the assets of foreigners. As Jeswald Salacuse notes,
gradually, greater protections were included in these treaties, although
they did not provide for direct dispute resolution by investors against
host states.18 Foreign investors essentially had two options if their
investment was somehow impaired by the host state. As the doctrine
governing international legal personality identifies states as the
primary subjects of international law and generally does not allow an
individual or corporation to take a legal action against a state, foreign
investors had to rely on diplomacy and political influence in order to
persuade their home state to advance a legal claim on their behalf. 19
The alternative was to initiate a claim in the national court of the host
state under national law. Neither option proved to be satisfactory for
the foreign investors; the first did not guarantee compensation, while
the second rarely resulted in their success.
After World War II, the United States began incorporating
investment protections into its FCN treaties. The United States
supported what was known as the "Hull Rule," articulated by U.S.
Secretary of State Cordell Hull in a note to the Mexican Minister of
Foreign Affairs, concerning compensation due upon the Mexican
expropriation of foreign-owned agrarian and oil properties. 20 The Hull
Rule describes the standard of compensation due under customary
2
international law as "adequate, effective and prompt" compensation. 1
However, while supported by the developed world, this rule was
challenged in the post-World War II period by developing countries who
were emerging as independent states during decolonization. The wave

16. See CHARLES LIPSON, STANDING GUARD: PROTECTING FOREIGN CAPITAL IN THE
NINETEENTH AND TWENTIETH CENTURIES 133 (1985) ('LDCs have managed to redefine the
rules affecting international investments and so alter the context of bargaining between
individual firms and host countries.").
17. Barnali Choudhury, Recapturing Public Power: Is Investment Arbitration's
Engagement of the Public Interest Contributing to the Democratic Deficit?, 41 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 775, 780 (2008).
18. Jeswald W. Salacuse, The Emerging Global Regime for Investment, 51 HARV. INT'L
L.J. 427, 438, 444 (2010).
19. Id. at 439.
20. See ANDREW NEWCOMBE & LLUfS PARADELL, LAW AND PRACTICE OF INVESTMENT
TREATIES: STANDARDS OF TREATMENT 18 (2009).
21. Id.
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of nationalizations and expropriations (direct takings) without
compensation that took place during this time led to the erosion of the
rule as a principle of customary international law. Mexico rejected the
22
rule, as did other Latin American countries and the Soviet Union.
These states engaged in massive expropriations without compensation.
Salacuse observes that the average number of nationalizations of
foreign investor property rose steadily from about slightly more than
fifteen per year in 1960 to over fifty per year in 1975.23
During this time the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA)
was the focus of developing countries' claims for a New International
Economic Order. The 1962 UNGA Resolution on Permanent Sovereignty
Over Natural Resources articulated the standard of compensation as
appropriate compensation in accord with laws of the host state, 24 and by
the mid-1970s the rule had ceased to have the status of customary
international law. This left the law governing foreign investment
uncertain, with capital exporting states advancing the Hull Rule, and
capital importing states rejecting it in a highly politicized standoff.
International investment agreements emerged as the solution to the
uncertainty over the applicable legal rules and standards in the late
1960s, although the first Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) was entered
into in 1959 between West Germany and Pakistan. Japan and the
United States eventually signed BITs as well--Japan in 1977 and the
United States in 1982.25 The significant thing about these agreements is
that they delocalized and denationalized the investment relationship by
providing investing corporations and individuals the legal rights to sue
the host state directly in binding arbitration proceedings conducted by
arbitrators selected by the disputing parties outside the legal
institutions of the host state. 26 The International Centre for the
Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) was created in 1966 under
the auspices of the World Bank to provide investors with the
institutional framework for taking direct legal action under a BIT
against host states. 27 At first the developing countries were unwilling to
use it: ICSID heard its first case in 1972.28 However, as the UNCTAD
22. See A. Claire Cutler, Human Rights Promotion Through TransnationalInvestment
Regimes: An InternationalPoliticalEconomy Approach, 1 Pol. & Governance 16, 19 (2013).
23. See Salacuse, supra note 18, at 435 n.42.
24. See Cutler, supra note 22, at 19.
25. Andrew T. Guzman, Why LDCs Sign Treaties That Hurt Them: Explaining the
Popularityof BilateralInvestment Treaties, 38 VA. J. INT'L L. 639, 653 & n.54 (1998).
26. Id. at 680.
27. See Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and
Nationals of Other States art. 1, United Nations, Oct. 14, 1966.
28. See generally Holiday Inns/Occidental Petroleum v. Government of Morocco, ICSID
Case No. ARB/721l (1972).
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World Investment Report 2015 notes, the pace of BIT signing picked up
and saw vast expansion by the 1990s, leading to today's situation where
investor-state arbitrations occur regularly under the auspices of ICSID,
under Chapter 11 of the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA) and the Energy Charter Treaty.
The development of this investor-state regime and the steady global
expansion of international investment agreements are thus due to a
number of geopolitical, economic, institutional, and ideological
developments. 29 The important point to note is that these agreements
are designed to protect the foreign investor through the guarantee of
delocalized and denationalized dispute settlement. In providing direct
legal access for foreign investors against host states without having to
go to national courts, the agreements bypass the exhaustion of local
remedies, a rule commonly applied in a variety of disputes, including
those concerning international human rights. Moreover, these
agreements in effect grant "private persons and companies the right to
compel a sovereign state to appear before a tribunal and defend its
sovereign actions ostensibly taken to protect the public interest." 30 This
has been described as a "revolutionary innovation" that has caused a
"paradigm shift" in and "profound transformation" of international
law. 31 Even in the World Trade Organization (WTO), which possesses
one of the most developed dispute settlement systems, private actors do
not have legal standing-only states, as members of the WTO, may
bring actions. 32 Salacuse notes of these important developments:
Thus, the global investment regime has granted a
private right of action to investors. It has thereby
privatized the decisionmaking process to a large extent.
Not only are private parties involved as litigants, but
also as arbitrators-the decision makers in the processwho are private persons compensated by the disputants,

29. See generally YVES DEZALAY & BRYANT G. GARTH, DEALING IN VIRTUE:
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF A TRANSNATIONAL
LEGAL ORDER (1996) (detailing the construction of an independent legal field that thrust
transnational lawyers centrally into international markets).
30. Salacuse, supranote 18, at 460.
31. Jilrgen Bering et al., GENERAL PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT LAW: A RESEARCH SKETCH ON SELECTED ISSUES 43, 46 & n.175 (Christian
Tietje et al. eds., 2011).
32. Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994,
1867 U.N.T.S. 154.
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The typical BIT contains three elements: definitions, substantive
obligations for host states, and provisions for binding investor-state
arbitration. In most treaties, "investment" is defined very broadly to
include a range of agreements. Often, "umbrella clauses" are used to
bring under the jurisdiction of the BIT all contractual arrangements
that the host state might enter into with the foreign investor. This may
work to internationalize many contracts that would otherwise be subject
to the jurisdiction of the host state's legal system. 3 4 In addition to
providing definitions of investment, the typical BIT will establish
general standards of behavior of the host state. The common standards
include "fair and equitable treatment," "full protection and security,"
"national treatment," "most-favored-nation treatment," and "treatment
in accordance with international law." The BIT will also include specific
standards concerning the investment, such as dealing with monetary
transfers, expropriation, and investor rights during war, revolution, or
civil unrest. The BIT will rarely state specific consequences of a breach,
but arbitration tribunals have held uniformly that compensation is due
upon breaches resulting in injury on the basis of customary
international law. Finally, the BIT will provide for a binding
enforcement mechanism for investors and will often designate the
arbitration institutions and rules to be adopted. Investor-state dispute
resolution therefore delocalizes the proceedings by removing them from
the jurisdiction of the local legal system. Denationalization and
delocalization of controls over foreign investment have in turn
generated considerable concern among governments and a variety of
civil society groups. Criticism of the regime takes many forms and
contributes in significant ways to state transformation.
B. Criticism and the Counter-Movement: TransformationH
investment
rationale for constitutionalizing
The standard
protections in legal agreements mirrors more general beliefs that the
enhanced rule of law is basically good for business. As a lawyer for a
leading law firm observes: "It is globally acknowledged that the rule of

33. Salacuse, supra note 18, at 460.
34. For a discussion of the transformation in statehood resulting from the
internationalization of contracts through the combined forces of private and public
international law, see Sheldon Leader, Statehood, Power, and the New Face of Consent, 23
IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 127 (2016).
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law is essential for sustainable long-term economic growth. '35 According
to this view, it is axiomatic that investment protections increase the
security of contracts, protect intellectual property rights, and provide for
fair dispute resolution, all of which are assumed to contribute to
economic development. However, many are questioning whether the
investment protections actually do encourage economic development.
Several studies reveal that the signing of a BIT has no substantial
correlation to an increase in foreign direct investment and that
increased investment depends on other factors, such as political climate,
36
resource and transportation availability, and institutional stability.
In addition, the use of investment arbitration to settle disputes has
come under attack. It is standard for BITs to provide international
arbitration as the method for dispute settlement and to identify the
institution to be utilized, such as ICSID or other private arbitration
tribunals. Often the arbitration rules to be utilized will also be specified,
such as those of the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) or the
United National Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL).
NAFTA provides for ICSID or UNCITRAL as the dispute settlement
rules available to the parties under the Chapter 11 investor-state
37
provision.
This delocalization of investor-state dispute settlement through
binding dispute resolution in specialized tribunals is criticized for
locking states into accepting limitations on their legislative and policy
autonomy. The "locking in" function is a crucial dimension of the
operation of neoliberal discipline under new constitutionalism. 3s To
illustrate, most BITs give general consent to delocalized, binding
arbitration. This contrasts with consent that is specific to a particular
contract to arbitrate, where the parties will be governed by the domestic
rules of contract under the applicable system of private international
35. Kevin Coon, Good Law Means Good Business - in Any Market, THE GLOBE AND
MAIL, June 23, 2015, at B4.
36. See, e.g., Jennifer L. Tobin & Susan Rose-Ackerman, When BITs Have Some Bite:
The Political-Economic Environment for Bilateral Investment Treaties, REV. INT'L ORG.
(2006) (showing that BITs cannot be judged in isolation, but instead within the context of
political, economic, and institutional features of the host country signing the BIT and in
light of the worldwide BITs regime); Jason Webb Yackee, Bilateral Investment Treaties,
Credible Commitment, and the Rule of (International)Law: Do BITs Promote Foreign
Direct Investment?, 42 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 805 (2008) (concluding that BITs do not
meaningfully influence investment decisions, a result consistent with research).
37. See North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Ch. 11, art. 1130, Dec.
17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 289 (1993).
38. See STEPHEN GILL, POWER AND RESISTANCE IN THE NEW WORLD ORDER 163 (2d ed.

2008) ("New constitutionalism can be understood historically as . . . a political project to
'lock in' the power gains of capital on a world scale - it combines the old and the radically
new.").
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law. The general consent given by a host state in a BIT "is general
because it authorizes the arbitration of any future dispute with any
foreign investor [of the state party] in the state's territory" and operates
like a '"lank cheque which may be cashed for an unknown amount at a
future, and as yet unknown, date," transforming "investor-state
arbitration from a modified form of commercial arbitration into a
system to control the state's exercise of regulatory authority with
39
respect to investors as a group."
The investor-state regime privatizes dispute settlement by
identifying specialized arbitration institutions that operate like a
private justice system, quite autonomously from national legal
systems. 40 As mentioned above, NAFTA identifies ICSID and
UNCITRAL rules as the dispute settlement mechanisms available to
foreign investors. These rules are modeled on the principles governing
private
commercial
arbitration
between two parties
where
confidentiality has been a driving concern. The origins of the investorstate dispute resolution system in the laws and culture of private
international commercial arbitration have proved very challenging for
democratic forces seeking to gain access to and information about their
proceedings. Indeed, in many ways this extension of commercial
arbitration to the settlement of disputes involving public authorities is
producing a clash of legal cultures between public international law
traditions, emphasizing the protection of human rights, the
environment, and other matters of public concern, and private
international law, emphasizing the autonomy of commercial actors to
conduct their private affairs as they see fit.
In fact, many believe that the general consent to delocalized and
privatized dispute resolution produces a "democratic deficit":
State parties to investment agreements can no longer
legislate at will in the public interest without concern
that an arbitral tribunal will determine that the
legislation constitutes interference with an investment.
Thus investment arbitration may result in an overall
loss of state independence and sovereignty, which has

39. Gus Van Harten, Private Authority and Transnational Governance: The Contours
of the InternationalSystem of Investor Protection, 12 REV. INT'L POL. ECON. 600, 607-08

(2005).
40. See A. CLAIRE CUTLER, PRIVATE POWER AND GLOBAL AUTHORITY: TRANSNATIONAL
MERCHANT LAW IN THE GLOBAL POLITIcAL ECONOMY 183 (2003) ("The devolution of
authority to resolve disputes and to enforce agreements to the private sphere through the
increasing legitimacy of private arbitration . . . [is] perfecting this reconfiguration of
political authority. This is reordering state-society relations both locally and globally.").
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implications for democratic governance . . . . [The
question arises whether state exercises of public
authority should be adjudicated by foreigners, largely on
the basis of commercial principles, when the
adjudicators are unconcerned with the wider effects of
41
their decisions.
Indeed, some believe that the most significant institutions engaged
in investor-state arbitration, such as ICSID and UNCITRAL, are
structurally biased towards developed states and business corporations.
They argue that the awards of these institutions regularly favor the
commercial interests of powerful investing corporations over the
development concerns of weaker states. 42 Doubts about the impartiality
of arbitrators, inconsistent arbitral awards, secrecy of the proceedings,
and the absence of any appeal mechanism for reviewing arbitration
awards contribute to further skepticism about dispute settlement under
43
the regime.
Such concerns and criticisms have given rise to resistance to the
investor-state regime from a number of sources. A variety of civil society
groups, such as human rights, labor, and environmental organizations,
are pressuring their governments to step in and reassert their policy
and legislative autonomy. Governments are responding in a number of
interesting ways that signal important transformations in statehood. A
significant development is the appeal to international human rights to
shore up these efforts to regain access to the policy and legislative levers
that have been restrained by new constitutional governance under the
investor-state regime.
II. HUMAN

RIGHTS, STATEHOOD, AND RESISTANCE TO THE INVESTOR-

STATE REGIME

The ability of governments or civil society groups to challenge the
investor-state regime by appealing to international human rights is
challenged by many of the same problems associated with more general
41. Choudhury, supra note 17, at 778-79.
42. See Gus Van Harten, Investment Treaty Arbitration,ProceduralFairness, and the
Rule of Law, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND COMPARATIVE PUBLIC LAW 642-43
(Stephan W. Schill ed., 2010) (focusing on institutional and procedural aspects of these
institutional systems that raise suspicions of bias); see also Julien Fouret, The World Bank
and ICSID: Family or Incestuous Ties?, 4 INT'L ORG. L. REV. 121, 123 (2007) (arguing that
the financial aspect of the activity of the World Bank provided an incentive to invest in
developing States, but the same States appear in ICSID tribunals, the child institution of
the World Bank).
43. See Van Harten, supra note 42.
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efforts to hold transnational corporations accountable under
international law for human rights. As Rachel Anderson argues,
"[foreign] direct investment policy-making continues to rely heavily on
neoclassical economic theory," which advocates minimal government
intervention to allow the market to generate public prosperity. 44 She
notes further that the bilateral investment treaty is "generally
structured to protect transnational corporations from acts of
expropriation . . . without adequate compensation . . . [and] tend[s] to
omit societal stakeholders, such as individuals and communities
affected by businesses owned, operated, or managed by transnational
corporations." 45 Indeed, the distinction between private international
law (conceived of as relating to commercial matters, governed by the
principle of party autonomy) and public international law (regarded as
relating to matters of a public nature between states) has obstructed the
development of an understanding of overlap or nexus between the
private and public spheres and of the political nature of many private
46
matters.
The regulatory preference in the investment regime has been on
voluntarism and the promotion of soft, nonbinding corporate social
responsibilities (CSRs). 47 However, the voluntary nature of rules
seeking to hold corporations accountable, such as the Guidelines on
Multinational Corporations (MNCs) and the UNGPs issued by the
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, poses real
problems of enforceability. Indeed, the UNGPs make clear the
distinction between the "responsibilities" that businesses have for
upholding human rights and the "legal duties" of states to protect the
rights of foreign investors. 48 This distinction between the responsibilities
44. Rachel J. Anderson, Toward Global Corporate Citizenship: Reframing Foreign
Direct Investment Law, 18 MICH. ST. U. COLL. L. J. INT'L L. 1, 2 (2009).
45. Id. at 4.
46. See A. Claire Cutler, Artifice, Ideology, and Paradox: The Public/Private in
International Law, 4 REV. INT'L POL. ECON. 261, 274-76 (1997) ("[T]he [public/private]
distinction still operates conceptually and ideologically, serving to conceal the
foundational role played by private international law in legitimizing processes of
privatization and globalization.").
47. For an insightful discussion of CSR, see generally Radu Mares, De-centering
Human Rights from the InternationalOrder of States: The Alignment and Interaction of
TransnationalPolicy Channels, 23 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 171 (2016).
48. The second guiding principle articulates the "expectation that all business
enterprises . . . respect human rights throughout their operations[,]" Special
Representative of the Secretary-General, Guiding Principles on Business and Human
Rights: Implementing the United Nations 'Protect, Respect and Remedy" Framework
Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-Generalon the Issue of Human Rights
and TransnationalCorporations and Other Business Enterprises, 7, 17th Sess. Hum. Rts.
Council, U.N. Doc. AIHRC/17/31 (March 21, 2011), while the commentary attached
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of corporations and the legal duties of states has its origin in public
international law. As mentioned earlier, the doctrine of international
legal personality traditionally limits legal subjectivity to states and to
state representatives, thus blocking corporations from holding rights or
duties under international law. Only states or their delegates are
competent to enter into international treaties and to hold legal rights
and duties thereunder, unless legal rights and duties are found
elsewhere, as in the case of international human rights law. In the past,
any protections to be accorded to foreign investors depended on the
principles of state responsibility to aliens and their property and on the
political discretion of a home state to advance the interests of investing
nationals. Prior to the development of the investor-state regime and the
legal capacity for a corporation to directly sue a host state, the investing
corporation really had no direct rights, but only those that its national
state might or might not enforce on its behalf. In terms of the legal
duties of foreign investing corporations, the investor-state regime is
basically silent. Recall that IIAs and BITs articulate the rights of
investing states, but not the rights of host states. The investor-state
regime is designed to protect the foreign investor and investment. Any
legal duties of transnational corporations to protect human rights must
therefore be found outside the investor-state regime. This one-sided
nature of the investor-state regime has prompted some to conclude that
it distorts the balance between public and private authority:
[T]he one-sided nature of the dispute settlement system,
in which only private investors may initiate a claim and
only states must pay damages, privileges private
property and contract rights over the public interest. It
creates a system of third-party beneficiaries, making the
regime more rigid. It promotes private rights and
relegates states to defensive status. BITs thus collapse
the public/private binary and shift the boundary
between the public good and private interests by
privatizing part of the public. This re-conceptualization
limits the influence of "public" concepts traditionally
considered part of the state such as human rights, the
49
environment, and democracy.

provides that the "responsibility of business enterprises to respect human rights is distinct
from issues of legal liability and enforcement, which remain defined largely by national
law provisions in relevant jurisdiction." Id. at 13-14.
49. Asha Kaushal, Revisiting History: How the Past Matters for the Present Backlash
Against the Foreign Investment Regime, 50 HARV. INT'L L.J. 491, 519 (2009).
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The investor-state regime has thus made a profound impact on
statehood by according significant rights to foreign investors vis-a-vis
states, but has simultaneously limited the ability of host states to
regulate their domestic societies in ways that might impair foreign
investment. Paradoxically, foreign investors have utilized these one-way
agreements to develop and expand the rights provided them under
guaranteed standards of "fair and equitable treatment," "full protection
and security," "national treatment," "most-favored-nation treatment,"
and "treatment in accordance with international law." While there are
several ways that human rights have entered into the investor-state
regime, 50 an interesting dialectic is emerging in the impact that
international human rights are having on the investment regime and
statehood. In some cases international human rights are being raised by
foreign investors in defense of their property and market-based rights
under the investment regime. In such cases, human rights are used to
shore up and even expand the private property rights protected by
investment agreements. However, in other cases, as in a Polanyian
countermovement, human rights are used to contest the foundations of
the investment regime and to reassert statehood and the protection of
rights other than market-based rights.
By far the most active reliance on human rights doctrines has been
that of foreign investors advancing their right to standards of treatment
provided for in the investment agreement or BIT. Indeed, corporations
have greatly expanded the scope of corporate rights in the development
of arbitral decisions clarifying the nature and scope of treaty-based
rights, such as "fair and equitable treatment," "full protection and
security," "national treatment," "most-favored-nation treatment," and
"treatment in accordance with international law". 51 In many cases
foreign investors have invoked human rights protections provided in a
number of regional and international human rights treaties, thereby
expanding the investment regime. Specifically, the protections afforded
by the European Convention on Human Rights in cases taken before the
European Court of Human Rights have been a significant vehicle for
investor claims, in addition to claims being made before arbitrations
50. Briefly, human rights might be raised by foreign investors in protection of rights
they have under the investment agreement in a claim against a host state; they may be
relied upon by the host state in defense of a claim; or they may be raised by a nondisputing party (NDP). Human rights may also be raised by the Tribunal and utilized by
arbitrators as construction aids in interpreting the provisions of a BIT. Finally human
rights might be expressly incorporated into a BIT. See Cutler, supra note 22, at 25-28.
51. See generally NEWCOMBE & PARADELL, supra note 20 (examining the origins and
evolution of investment treaty law and practice, the law applicable to investment treaty
disputes, and substantive investment legal issues, including standards of treatment and
exceptions and defenses to treaty obligations).
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under the relevant BITs. 52 However, of more interest to this discussion
are the instances where human rights have been relied on to contest the
operations of the investor-state regime.
In a number of cases, host states have raised human rights in
defense of claims that they have breached an investment agreement.
Many of these cases concern disputed public utility investments, often
prompting the host state's defense that it was protecting a variety of
human rights. Numerous such cases resulted from the Argentinian
financial crisis and contentious privatization initiatives for gas, water,
and sewage services. 53 In a review of these cases, Reiner and Schreuer
conclude that the host state human rights claims "have been met with
little enthusiasm" 54 ; the awards "seem to indicate the tribunals'
reluctance to take up matters concerning human rights, preferring to
dismiss the issues raised on a procedural basis rather than dealing with
the substantive arguments themselves." 55 In CMS Gas v. Argentina, the
tribunal found that there were no fundamental human rights affected,
rejecting the Argentinian claim that emergency measures taken
(limitations on deposits and abolishment of dollarization) were
necessary to secure Argentinian citizens' fundamental right to be
protected from the vicissitudes of the market in a crisis. 56 In a close
reading of the tribunal's reasoning, David Schneiderman caustically
observes that this award "illustrates how economic globalization's legal
order is intended to check national legislative action in regard to
markets, despite the fact that national states continue to provide critical
57
legitimating supports to the global project."

52. See, e.g., LUKE ERIC PETERSON, HUMAN RIGHTS AND BILATERAL INVESTMENT
TREATIES: MAPPING THE ROLE OF HUMAN RIGHTS LAW WITHIN INVESTOR-STATE
ARBITRATION 23 n.44 (2009) (concerning the Russian oil company, Yukos, and claims

against Ukrainian government made by Limited Liability Company AMTO).
53. See, e.g., CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. Republic of Argentina, ICSID Case No.
121 (May 12, 2005); Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona
ARB/01/08, Award,
S.A. and Vivendi Universal, S.A. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/19,
1-2 (July 30, 2010); Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de
Decision on Liability,
Barcelona S.A. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/19, Decision on Liability,
1-2 (July 30, 2010).
54. Clara Reiner & Christoph Schreuer, Human Rights and InternationalInvestment
Arbitration, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND ARBITRATION 82,
90 (Pierre-Marie Dupuy et al. eds., 2009).
55. Id.
56. See CMS Gas, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/08, 121 ("[T]he Tribunal does not find any
[T]here is no question of affecting fundamental human rights when
such collision ....
considering the issues disputed by the parties.").
57. DAVID SCHNEIDERMAN, RESISTING ECONOMIC GLOBALIZATION: CRITICAL THEORY
AND INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 45 (2013).
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Other cases involving water and sewage privatization initiatives
were brought against Argentina. In each case, the state was engaged in
water-sector privatization schemes and the granting of concessions to
foreign water corporations. In Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de
Barcelona S.A. and Vivendi Universal S.A v. Argentine Republic, an
ICSID arbitration, investors were claiming breach of a number of BITs
that Argentina had entered into with their home countries. 58 The case
involved a thirty-year contract to manage a water and sewage
concession. 59 Over the course of the relationship, a number of disputes
arose and, with the intensification of the Argentine financial crisis, the
parties were at odds over the tariff-rates charged to consumers. The
investors wanted to modify the rates under the economic-equilibrium
clause in the concession agreement. However, Argentina resisted. The
human right to water was invoked by Argentina as one argument in its
defense of necessity to its termination of the water concession,
supported by amici curiae submissions filed by five nongovernmental
organizations (NGOs) (this case is the first under ICSID in which such
submissions were accepted despite the objections of one of the parties).
The tribunal emphasized the "defense's exceptional nature and the
strict conditions surrounding its application." 60 It rejected Argentina's
defense "because Argentina's measures in violation of the BITs were not
the only means to satisfy its essential interests and because Argentina
itself contributed to the emergency situation that it was facing in 20012003."61

The tribunal's evaluation of the human-right-to-water argument is
relatively brief and occurs within its consideration of the third element
of the defense of necessity, that the treaty obligation does not exclude
the necessity defense, an element Argentina was held to have satisfied.
Nevertheless, the tribunal emphasized that Argentina's obligations to
uphold human rights were additional to its obligation to uphold their
investment treaty commitments and did not relieve it from those
obligations:
Argentina and the amicus curiae submissions received
by the Tribunal suggest that Argentina's human rights
obligations to assure its population the right to water
somehow trumps its obligations under the BITs and that
the existence of the human right to water also implicitly
58. See
ARB/03/19,
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.

Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona S.A., ICSID Case No.
1-2.
34.
258.
265.
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gives Argentina the authority to take actions in
disregard of its BIT obligations. The Tribunal does not
find a basis for such a conclusion either in the BITs or
international law. Argentina is subject to both
international obligations, i.e. human rights and treaty
obligations, and must respect both of them equally.
Under the circumstances of these cases, Argentina's
human rights obligations and its investment treaty
obligations are not inconsistent, contradictory, or
mutually exclusive. Thus, as discussed above, Argentina
62
could have respected both types of obligations.
Impregilo S.p.A. v. Argentine Republic involved a factual
background similar to the Suez case. 63 Here, the dispute was over
Argentina's refusal to permit price increases in the context of currency
devaluation brought about by the Argentine financial crisis and the
state's eventual transfer of the water and sewage service back to a
state-sponsored company. As in the Suez case, Argentina invoked the
defense of necessity based in part on its obligation to fulfill the human
right to water. The human right to water was only indirectly addressed
in the majority's decision. The tribunal held that the state's obligation to
provide water was encompassed by the definition of an "essential
interest," which a defendant must prove has been imperiled in claiming
the defense of necessity:
[T]he term "essential interest" can encompass not only
the existence and independence of a State itself, but also
other subsidiary but nonetheless "essential" interests,
such as the preservation of the State's broader social,
economic and environmental stability, and its ability to
provide for the fundamental needs of its population. It
follows that, in addition to Argentina's overall stability,
the need to provide the population with water and
sewage facilities represented an "essential interest"
which, in regard to thousands of people, was to be served
by AGBA's concession and which would allegedly be
"imperiled" for them but for the acts of the Argentine
authorities.64

62. Id. 262.
63. Impregilo S.p.A. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/17, Award,
231 (June 21, 2011).
64. Id. 346 (footnote omitted).

195-
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Although the tribunal found that there was a grave and imminent
peril to the essential interest of Argentina's economic stability, it
ultimately held that Argentina contributed to the crisis and thus was
not successful in invoking the necessity defense, with no further
reference to the human right to water.
Schneiderman argues that, in the Suez case,
[i]t simply was beyond the capacity of the tribunal to
acknowledge even the possibility of reversing the
investment law regime's order of priority.... One gets the
sense that these tribunals believed that Argentina not
only contributed to its own demise, it actually benefited
65
from its aggressive embrace of market disciplines.
Others have suggested that these cases reveal "structural
differences" between the orientations of public international law and
international investment law that have biased investment tribunals
toward enforcing the contractual rules agreed upon by host states and
investors over the enforcement of conflicting obligations such as human
66
rights.
There is much evidence suggesting that the developing arbitral
norm is restraint in expanding the defensive reliance on human rights
in investment relations. In Glamis Gold Ltd. v. United States of
America, Glamis Gold Ltd., a publicly held Canadian corporation
engaged in the mining of precious metals, submitted a NAFTA claim to
arbitration under the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules on behalf of its
enterprises Glamis Gold, Inc. and Glamis Imperial Corporation for
alleged injuries relating to a proposed gold mine in Imperial County,
California.6 7 Glamis claimed that certain federal and state measures
with respect to open-pit mining operations resulted in the expropriation
of its investments and denied its investments the minimum standard of
treatment under international law. The California measures included
regulations requiring backfilling and grading for mining operations in
the vicinity of Native American sacred sites. Glamis claimed damages of
not less than $50 million. The tribunal refused the award, dismissing
Glamis's claim in its entirety and ordering Glamis to pay two-thirds of
68
the arbitration costs in the case.
65. SCHNEIDERMAN, supra note 57, at 49.
66. Moshe Hirsch, Interactions Between Investment and Non-Investment Obligations,
in

THE OXFORD

HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL

INVESTMENT

Muchlinski et al. eds., 2008).
67. Glamis Gold, Ltd. v. United States, ICSID, Award,
68. Id. 26.

LAW

154,

179 (Peter

10-11 (June 8, 2009).
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In Glamis Gold, the Quechan Indian Nation submitted an amicus
curiae brief arguing that the NAFTA provisions should be interpreted in
a manner consistent with U.S. obligations in treaty and customary law
to protect indigenous peoples' land and resources. In general, the award
contains many references to the Quechan Nation, particularly during
the course of the factual overview, which details their involvement in
various environmental and cultural impact assessments. The backfilling
and grading requirements were imposed by the state as an attempt to
protect adjacent Quechan sacred sites without imposing an outright ban
on mining, or even more excessive costs on Glamis. The tribunal held
that the economic impact of the state's measures were not sufficient to
effect expropriation of Glamis's investment. 69 The respondent did not
choose to incorporate into its defense the arguments made in the amicus
curiae brief of the Quechan Indian Nation. As a result, there is no
reference to human rights claims or their incorporation into the concept
of fair and equitable treatment, either in the respondents' arguments or
in the tribunal's analysis. While the tribunal ultimately dismissed the
claim by the investor, it briefly considered harms relating to the
proposed mining project and concluded that the measures adopted by
the host state were not arbitrary. In the following comments the
tribunal clearly indicated that it was not taking into account the human
rights and environmental claims raised:
The Tribunal is aware that the decision in this
proceeding has been awaited by private and public
entities concerned with environmental regulation, the
interests of indigenous peoples, and the tension
sometimes seen between private rights in property and
the need of the State to regulate the use of property. ...
However, given the Tribunal's holdings, the Tribunal is
not required to decide many of the most controversial
issues raised in this proceeding. The Tribunal observes
that a few awards have made statements not required
by the case before it. The Tribunal does not agree with
this tendency; it believes that its case-specific mandate
and the respect demanded for the difficult task faced
squarely by some future tribunal instead argues for it to
7o
confine its decision to the issues presented.

69. Id.
70. Id.

17.
8.
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As in the Glamis case, it appears that human rights may also arise
in an investment relationship through the agency of nonparties. In fact,
the applications of civil society, environmental, and human rights
groups to participate in investor-state arbitration proceedings as amici
curiae have proliferated and have been a source of significant
development in enhancing the public and participatory dimensions of
the regime. The initial response of tribunals to broadening participation
to nonparties was not positive. In Aguas del Tunari v. Bolivia,
petitioners in ICSID proceedings argued for amici curiae participation
on the basis of the right to a fair trial under the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights. 71 The case involved a claim by Bechtel, an
American company operating the water and sewage system for
Cochabamba, Bolivia, through its subsidiary, Aguas del Tunari, under a
forty-year lease, as part of a World Bank-inspired privatization scheme.
Within weeks of taking over the operation of the water system, the rates
were increased by so much that families living on the minimum wage
were being billed up to 25 percent of their monthly income. The rate
increases resulted in massive protests, the declaration of martial law,
and many injuries. 72 Protests continued, and in 2000 Bechtel abandoned
the project and filed a claim for lost profits. The claim was filed with
ICSID under the Dutch-Bolivian BIT and, despite Bolivia's opposition,
the tribunal ruled that it had jurisdiction over the dispute through
Bechtel's subsidiary in the Netherlands.7 3 The case remained in
arbitration for some years until Bechtel, responding to pressure to drop
the case, settled the $50 million claim for a symbolic thirty cents. 74
Several NGOs filed petitions for amici curiae participation and argued
that the people affected by the soaring water prices were being denied
the human right to water. 75 The petitions to submit amicus briefs were
rejected on the grounds that the tribunal lacked the authority to admit
the briefs of nonparties in the absence of the parties' consent, but left
76
the door open for such submissions in other cases.

71. See Aguas del Tunari, S.A. v. Republic of Bol., ICSID Case No. ARB/02/3, Petition
to Participate of La Coordinadora para la Defensa del Agua y Vida et al., 1 47-48 (Aug.
29, 2002); Aguas del Tunari, S.A. v. Republic of Bol., ICSID Case No. ARB/02/3, Letter
from President of Tribunal Responding to Petition (Jan. 29, 2003).
72. Aguas, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/3, Petition to Participate at 1.
73. Aguas del Tunari, S.A. v. Republic of Bol., ICSID Case No. ARB/02/3, Decision on
Respondent's Objections to Jurisdiction, at 79 (Oct. 21, 2005).
74. ELENA BLANCO & JOHN RAZZAQUE, GLOBALIZATION AND NATURAL RESOURCE LAW:

CHALLENGES, KEY ISSUES AND PERSPECTIVES 261 (2011).
75. Amanda Norris and Katina Metzidakis, Public Protests, Private Contracts:
Confidentiality in ICSID Arbitrationand the Cochabamba Water War, 15 HARv. NEGOT. L.
REV. 31, 50-51 (2010).
76. Id. at 53.
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The case of Methanex v. United States was the first investment
arbitration by a NAFTA tribunal under UNCITRAL rules that allowed
NGOs to submit written briefs as amici curiae.7 7 Methanex Corporation
is a Canadian company that claimed compensation for damages
resulting from the ban imposed by California on the use of methyl tertbutyl ether, a fuel additive produced by the company. 78 The
International Institute for Sustainable Development, NGOs for a Better
Environment, and the Earth Institute requested rights to submit briefs,
to be granted observer status, and to receive documentary materials.
The tribunal allowed the submission of briefs but not observer status or
access to materials on the basis of confidentiality and privilege.7 9 It
arrived at this decision after inviting comments from the parties and
other NAFTA states on the amicus petition. Methanex and Mexico
initially opposed the submission of briefs, while the United States and
Canada supported the petition. The tribunal differentiated between the
filing of an amicus submission and the adding of a party to the dispute,
stressed the importance of the parties' consent, and adopted a statement
on the participation of nondisputing parties provided by the NAFTA
Free Trade Commission (FTC).8 0 Subsequently, two briefs were filed by
the NGOs and were accepted by the parties.8 1
The FTC issued an interpretive note to the effect that Chapter 11
rules do not impose "a general duty of confidentiality or preclude the
Parties from providing public access to documents" and that the parties
"agree to make available to the public in a timely manner all documents
submitted" subject to confidential material which is privileged or
protected by law from disclosure.8 2 Subsequently, Canada and the
United States issued statements in support of opening NAFTA hearings
to the public using the appropriate technology (closed-circuit television,
Internet webcasting).8 3 Mexico later adopted this position as well. 84 It is

77. See Methanex Corp. v. United States, UNCITRAL, Decision of the Tribunal on
47 (Jan. 15, 2001)
Petitions from Third Persons to Intervene as "Amici Curia,"
[hereinafter Methanex Amicus Curia].
78. HOWARD MANN, THE FINAL DECISION IN METHANEX V. UNITED STATES: SOME NEW
WINE IN SOME NEW BOTTLES 2 (2005), available at http:Ilwww.iisd.org/pdf/2005/

commentary-methanex.pdf.
79. Methanex Amicus Curia, supra note 77, at 47.
24-52 (discussing the tribunal's decision and reasoning).
80. See generally id.
81. MANN, supra note 78, at 12.
82. NAFTA Free Trade Comm'n, Notes of Interpretation of Certain Chapter 11
Provisions (July 31, 2001), available at http://www.sice.oas.org/tpdnafta/Commission/
CH 1 lunderstandinge.asp.
83. Press Release, Office of the United States Representative, NAFTA Free Trade
Commission Joint Statement - "A Decade of Achievement," NAFTA Joint Statement (Jul.
16, 2004), available at https:/ustr.gov/archive/Document LibrarylPressReleases/2004/
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important to note, however, that the scope of amicus participation
remains very narrow and is regarded as performing a publicinformation function for the tribunals. It does not include participation
as an observer or access to documents, unless the parties consent.
The Methanex case established a precedent that subsequently
informed ICSID proceedings. ICSID Arbitration Rules were amended in
2006 to recognize the authority of a tribunal to admit amicus curiae
briefs with the consent of the disputing parties.8 5 This was followed in
the Suez case, mentioned above, as well as in a number of other cases
arising out of the Argentinian financial crisis. UNCITRAL has similarly
amended its procedures, adopting in 2014 Rules on Transparency in
Treaty-Based Investor-State Arbitration, which provide for open, public
86
hearings.
A number of ICSID arbitrations have challenged provisions of South
Africa's Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) policies that seek to
redress historical racial inequalities, illustrating the intersection of
investment obligations and human rights.8 7 The new post-apartheid
constitution provides for significant water, natural resource, and land
reforms that many argued conflict with South African commitments
under BITs. In 2006 European investors challenged South African
legislation that provided for greater participation of blacks in the
mining sector, mandated a 26 percent black ownership share, and
changed private ownership over natural resources to government
ownership and licensing arrangements.8 8 The legislation also provided
for sustainable development and raised a number of environmental
protection concerns.8 9 Italian investors who owned a granite company
filed an ICSID claim under the Italy-South African BIT claiming that
July/NAFTAFreeTradeCommissionJointStatement_-_ADecade ofAchievement.
html.
84. Id.
85. See generally Jason W. Yackee & Jarrod Wong, The 2006 Procedural and
Transparency-Related Amendments to the ICSID Arbitration Rules: Model Intentions,
Moderate Proposals, and Modest Returns (Univ. of Wisconsin Legal Studies Research
Paper No. 1151, Jan. 12, 2011), availableat http://papers.ssrn.comsol3/papers.cfm?
abstractid=1739174 (reviewing and evaluating the 2006 amendments to the ICSID
Arbitration Rules).
86. Rules on Transparency,supranote 9 at art. 6.
87. See, e.g., Piero Foresti, Laura de Carli & Others v. Republic of South Africa, ICSID
64 (Aug. 4, 2010); see also Swiss Investor v.
Case No. ARB (AF)/07/01, Award, at
Republic of South Africa, UNCITRAL, Partial Award (July 2003).
88. Andrew Friedman, Flexible Arbitrationfor the Developing World: Piero Foresti and
the Future of Bilateral Investment Treaties in the Global South, 7 INT'L L. & MGMT. REV.
37, 40-41 (2010) (discussing South Africa's post-apartheid policies that lead to the extratribunal arbitral case of Piero Foresti v. Republic of South Africa).
89. Id.
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the legislation violates protections against discrimination and
expropriation.9 0 Subsequently, Luxembourgish investors joined the
claim and a number of NGOs applied to participate as amici curiae.Two
South African NGOs, the Centre for Applied Legal Studies and the
Legal Resource Centre, and two international NGOs, the Centre for
International Environmental Law and the International Centre for the
Legal Protection of Human Rights (and later the International
Commission of Jurists), were successful in their petition to submit briefs
and gain access to key documents. 91 The NGOs argued that the BEE
should be upheld in order to address historic discrimination, thus
challenging investor rights with human rights. They also advanced
significant environmental concerns. However, the case was settled and
the claim discontinued. 92 It is noteworthy that this case precipitated
South Africa's decision to terminate its European BITs. 93 It showed the
potentially dangerous conflict between public policy goals and
international investment agreements providing for investor-state
dispute settlement (ISDS). As a result, South Africa is reconsidering its
adherence to ISDS (and has come forward with its "Promotion and
Protection of Investment Bill" in 2012, expected to be updated in 2015,
stating more precisely the national policy in addressing ISDS and BITs).
While the substantive human rights and environmental protection
issues were never decided, this case is regarded as significant in
expanding innovative participation procedures governing non-disputing
94
parties in ICSID.
Notably, the advancement of human rights claims against
corporations may be more successful outside the investor-state regime.
In Sawhoyamaxa v. Paraguay,95 the indigenous community,
Sawhoyamaxa, went before the Inter-American Court of Human Rights
to argue that their right to land was violated by Paraguay's not
returning to them lands held by a German investor. The right to land is

90. Piero Foresti,ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/07/1, 54.
91. Id.
25.
92. See id. 82.
93. Peter Leon et al., South Africa: South Africa Declines to Renew Bilateral
Investment Treaties With European Union Member States, MONDAQ (Oct. 5, 2012),
http://www.mondaq.com/x/199586/international trade investment/South (discussing the
consequences and reactions to the BIT termination).
94. See Christina Knahr, The New Rules on Participationof Non-Disputing Parties in
ICSID Arbitration:Blessing or Curse?, in EVOLUTION IN TREATY LAW AND ARBITRATION
319, 328-30 (Chester Brown & Kate Mills eds., 2011) (discussing dicta in PieroForesti and
the novelty of non-disputing party procedure).
95. Sawhoyamaxa v. Para., Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct.
H.R. (ser. C) No. 146 (Mar. 29, 2006).
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in fact recognized in Paraguay's constitution. 96 The government
defended by claiming that the expropriation of lands in favor of the
Sawhoyamaxa would constitute a breach of the German-Paraguay BIT,
but the court ruled that enforcement of a BIT does not justify
noncompliance with human rights obligations. 97 The court ruled that
the government had breached the constitutional right to land. 98 While it
was years before the government sought to rectify the situation, this
decision provides a good example of successful resistance to the
investor-state regime and the subordination of private investment
rights to public human rights.
This review illustrates how the legislative and policy autonomy of
states to regulate human rights or environmental and health
protections can be severely limited by the protections afforded foreign
investors under the investor-state regime. While there has clearly been
an expansion in the participation opportunities under NAFTA and
ICSID arbitrations, nonparty participation remains significantly limited
and the recognition of a nexus between investment obligations and
human rights has been uneven. However, some states are responding to
the one-sided nature of the investment agreement and are seeking to
regain some legislative and policy autonomy. A number of international
organizations are trying to recover the public dimension of private
agreements, while the United Nations has identified this as a crucial
determinant in sustainable development. 99 To what extent are there
possibilities for further transformations in statehood resulting from the
development of the understanding of the nexus between human rights
and the investor-state regime and for enhancing the democratic
legitimacy of the regime through better balancing these often conflicting
rights?
III.

ENHANCING THE LEGITIMACY OF THE INVESTOR-STATE REGIME

The investor-state treaty regime constitutes a domain of
international economic law that is a complex hybrid of private and
public international law, grafting dispute resolution mechanisms
developed for private international law onto public international law

96. See id. 1 122; see also Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples,
Comm'n on Human Rights, at 5-6, U.N. Doc. AIHRC/30/41 (Aug. 6, 2015) (by Victoria
Tauli Corpuz).
97. Sawhoyamaxa, Inter-Am Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 146, 137.
98. Id.
99. See WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT, supra note 5, at 124.
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treaties like HAs and BITs.100 This hybridity creates considerable
ambiguity concerning the nature and function of investment arbitration
proceedings and the appropriate interpretive doctrines and standards
that are to be applied by arbitration tribunals. Indeed, the private-law
origins of international commercial arbitration have given rise to
concerns about the propriety and adequacy of employing private law
concepts and practices informed by economic theories of law that fail to
address the political dimension of the legal regimes, particularly when
arbitral proceedings involve matters of public interest and concern.10 1
Private commercial and public international lawyers
have different perspectives on and different philosophies
about the role of law, the state, and the function of
dispute resolution. Also, their audiences and conceptual
approaches are often different. Whereas public
international lawyers embed international investment
law firmly in general international law and approach
the topic against that background, commercial
arbitration lawyers focus on dispute settlement and see
investment treaty arbitration as a subset of
10 2
international (commercial) arbitration.
Arguably, we require the development of a more complex
understanding of international investment regime in order to explore its
intersection with human rights and other matters of public interest and
law. For some, the field of international economic law, of which the
investor-state regime forms part, requires a new socio-legal approach
that is capable of integrating both the contexts and subtexts in which
legal texts operate, "sometimes for the objective purpose of achieving
clarity, sometimes with a view to changing them."10 3 Others have called
for greater pluralism in the "mapping" of international economic law to
account for the substantive expansion of the field, the proliferation of
100. See Zachary Douglas, The Hybrid Foundations of Investment Treaty Arbitration,74
BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 151, 153-58 (2003).
101. See William W. Burke-White & Andreas von Staden, PrivateLitigation in a Public
Law Sphere: The Standard of Review in Investor-State Arbitrations, 35 YALE J. INT'L L.
283, 285-86 (2010) ("[S]trict standards of review employed by many arbitral tribunals may
be inappropriate with respect to many issues raised in modern investor-state arbitrations
that are, at heart, public law questions.").
102. Stephan W. Schill, W(h)ither Fragmentation?On the Literature and Sociology of
InternationalInvestment Law, 22 EUR. J. INT'L L. 875, 888 (2011).
103. Amanda Perry-Kessaris, What Does it Mean to Take a Socio-Legal Approach to
InternationalEconomic Law?, in SOCIO-LEGAL APPROACHES TO INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC
LAW: TEXT, CONTEXT, SUBTEXT 3, 15 (Amanda Perry-Kessaris ed., 2013).
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diverse actors involved, and multiple sites of international economic
governance. 10 4 I have made the case for the need for a critical political
economy of international economic law that revisits distinctions
between economics and politics and between public and private
spheres. 105 Critical political economy puts the distributional question of
"who gets what" from private regimes of accumulation at the forefront of
analysis. 106 Similarly, David Schneiderman calls for a critical politicaleconomic understanding of legal pluralist accounts of the investor-state
regime that obscure the "ideological tilt" of the regime in favor of
powerful capital-exporting states and that impose disciplines that lock
host states into restrictions on their legislative and policy autonomy,
10 7
severely restraining their political choices and democratic potential.
The investor-state regime operates through legal agreements, rules, and
institutions that advance the protection of investor interests as the
raison ditre of the regime, but does this have to be the case?
We have seen an expansion of participation rules in NAFTA, the
WTO, ICSID, and UNCITRAL occurring in response to intense
mobilization by civil society groups, human rights activists,
environmentalists, and arbitration lawyers for increased public
participation in the investor-state regime. These developments have
enhanced the legitimacy of the investor-state regime considerably. But
to what extent could human rights obligations be written right into the
text of IIAs and BITs so as to form part of the investor-state legal
relationship?
John Ruggie, the former Special Representative of the United
Nations Secretary General on Business and Human Rights, adopted the
position in the Guiding Principles that important "governance gaps"
may be filled by express incorporation of obligations and rights into
investment agreement:
States should maintain adequate domestic policy space
to meet their human rights obligations when pursuing
104. See, e.g., Celine Tan, Navigating New Landscapes: Socio-Legal Mapping of
Plurality and Power in International Economic Law, in SOCIO-LEGAL APPROACHES TO
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW: TEXT, CONTEXT, SUBTEXT 19, 19 (Amanda Perry-Kessaris
ed., 2013).
105. A. Claire Cutler, Toward a Radical Political Economy Critique of Transnational
Economic Law, in INTERNATIONAL LAW ON THE LEFT: RE-EXAMINING MARXIST LEGACIES
199, 200 (Susan Marks ed., 2008).
106. See generally id.
107. See David Schneiderman, Power and Production in Global Legal Pluralism: An
International Political Economy Approach, in SOCIO-LEGAL APPROACHES To
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAw: TEXT, CONTEXT, SUBTEXT 98, 108 (Amanda PerryKessaris ed., 2013).
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business-related policy objectives with other States or
business enterprises, for instance through investment
treaties
or contracts
[...]
Economic
agreements

concluded by States, either with other States or with
business enterprises-such as bilateral investment
treaties, free-trade agreements or contracts for
investment projects-create economic opportunities for
States. But they can also affect the domestic policy space
of Governments. For example, the terms of international
investment agreements may constrain States from fully
implementing new human rights legislation, or put them
at risk of binding arbitration if they do so. Therefore,
States should ensure that they retain adequate policy
and regulatory ability to protect human rights under the
terms of such agreements, while providing the necessary
10 8
investor protection.
There is some evidence that investment agreements are being
conceptualized in this way. The International Institute for Sustainable
Development (IISD), which is a charitable organization registered in
Canada and financed almost completely by the Canadian government,
made the first express link between the foreign investment relationship
and sustainable development. i0 9 It also developed the first model
agreement that attempts to incorporate a variety of previously regarded
"non-treaty" obligations into the investment treaty.11 0 The IISD Model
International Investment Agreement states that its objective is "to
promote foreign investment that supports sustainable development, in
particular in developing and least-developed countries." 'll It also
provides for expropriation with compensation for public purposes,11 2 and
articulates the obligations of both the investing corporation and the host
state to uphold environmental, human, and labor rights.11 3
While the International Chamber of Commerce opposes the
inclusion of labor or environmental standards into BITs,114 and very few
108. Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Guiding Principles on Business
and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations "Protect, Respect and Remedy"
Framework, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/17/31, at 11 (Mar. 21, 2011) (by John Ruggie).
109. See HOWARD MANN ET AL., IISD MODEL INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT ON
INVESTMENT
FOR SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT
ii,
v (2005),
available at
https://www.iisd.org/pdf/2005/investment-modelint-agreement.pdf.

110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

Id. at iii.
Id. art. 1.
Id. art. 8.
Id. art. 21.
Van Harten, supranote 39, at 614.
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BITs mention human rights (save perhaps in general terms in the
preamble, as does the Dutch Model BIT), 115 some model BITs are
moving in this direction. Canada developed a new model Foreign
Investment Protection Agreement (FIPA), the Canadian equivalent of a
BIT.116 The model FIPA embodies changes resulting from controversial
experiences arbitrating under NAFTA's Chapter 11 investor-state
provision. 117 Controversy over Chapter 11 arbitrations stemmed from
the criticisms advanced by environmental and civil society groups that
investment commitments under NAFTA negatively impact public policy
in a number of areas and inhibit sustainable development. Concerns
about the secrecy of the arbitral proceedings and lack of public access to
information about investment disputes motivated a review of NAFTA
arbitrations by the NAFTA Free Trade Commission, which issued
guidelines on the participation of nondisputing parties. 118 As a result,
Canada and the United States agreed to open NAFTA arbitrations to
the public and have recently made the draft negotiating texts of NAFTA
arbitrations publicly available. The new model treaty addresses many of
the concerns expressed. The model FIPA refers to sustainable
development in the preamble and contains a GATT-like general
11 9
This
exception that applies to all the obligations in the model treaty.
animal
exception covers measures adopted for the protection of human
or plant life or 'health and conservation purposes. The model FIPA also
provides for public access to all documents and public arbitral
hearings. 120 In addition, it provides a procedure for nondisputing parties
to file written submissions.' 2' The U.S. model BIT goes further and
addresses the relationship between investment and labor rights and

115. See COMMENTARIES ON SELECTED MODEL INVESTMENT TREATIES 549 (Chester

Brown, ed., 2013).
116. See generally LUKE ERIC PETERSON, EVALUATING CANADA'S 2004 MODEL FOREIGN
INVESTMENT PROTECTION AGREEMENT IN LIGHT OF CIVIL SOCIETY CONCERNS (2006),

available at http://www.ccic.ca/_files/en/what we-do/trade_2006-06foreign-investment_
memoe.pdf (evaluating Canada's 2004 FIPA).
117. Id. at 2-3.
118. Id.
For the Promotion and Protection of
119. See Agreement Between Canada and __
Investments, art. 10, available at http://www.italaw.com/documents/Canadian2004-FIPAmodel-en.pdf [hereinafter Canada's Model FIPA].
120. However, the recently negotiated Canada-China FIPA departs from this practice
and does not provide for public access to documents and hearings in arbitration
proceedings as a general rule. See Catherine Walsh & Michael G. Woods, The CanadaChina Foreign Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement: Part II: Investor-State
Dispute Settlement Provisions, WOODS LAFORTUNE LLP (July 8, 2014), http://www.wltradelaw.comlthe-canada-china-foreign-investment-promotion-and-protection-agreementpart-ii-investor-state-dispute-settlement-provisions.
121. See Canada's Model FIPA, supra note 119, art. 33.
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expands the scope for state policy autonomy. The Australia-U.S. Free
Trade Agreement does not provide for investor-state arbitration, and in
2011 Australia announced that it would no longer include such
provisions in its trade agreements due to concerns about sovereignty.122
CONCLUSION
These developments indicate a rethinking of assumptions
concerning the nature and role of international commercial law and
practice and the boundaries of statehood. They also suggest the
emergence of a more critical understanding of the separations between
economics and politics and the private and public spheres that have
obscured the significant distributional impact of investment
agreements. There is decidedly more understanding today of the
"political" nature of the investor-state regime and its centrality as a
mechanism of global governance than in the past. This analysis reveals
that transformations in statehood have occurred in the past and
continue to take place under the investor-state regime. The first
transformation that served to narrowly circumscribe the policy and
legislative autonomy of states occasioned significant resistance and a
countermovement. A further transformation is underway amongst many
states seeking to regain lost or compromised autonomy. This is most
heartening in light of the typically glacial pace of international law.
These transformations also signal the important development of the
nexus between private corporate rights and international human rights.
However, there is much more room left for the investor-state regime to
accommodate human rights concerns, which in my view might be
advanced through activism at multiple levels.

122. AUSTL. GOV'T DEP'T OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS & TRADE, GILLARD GOVERNMENT TRADE
POLICY STATEMENT: TRADING OUR WAY TO MORE JOBS AND PROSPERITY 14 (Apr. 2011),
available at http://blogs.usyd.edu.au/japaneselaw/2011-Gillard%2OGovt%2OTrade%20
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